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We study bailouts of banks that suffer from debt overhang problems and have
private information about the quality of their assets-in-place and new investment
opportunities. Menus of bailout plans are used as a screening device. Constrained
optimality involves overcapitalization and nonlinear pricing, with worse types choos-
ing larger bailouts. When investment opportunities follow the assets, we derive an
equivalence result between equity injections and asset buyouts. The larger capital
outlay under asset buyouts can be offset by borrowing against the assets. If invest-
ment opportunities follow the bank, equity injections offer more upside to the bail-
out agency. This may reduce or enhance efﬁciency, depending on whether screening
intensity is needed mostly on assets-in-place or new investments. (JEL G28, G01,
D82)
The recent spate of banking crises, arising in part from “unanticipated”
declines in the quality of mortgage-backed loans and securities in U.S.
markets in particular, has brought to the fore issues of optimal mechan-
isms for restoring banks to well-functioning entities capable of further
lending to the real sector of an economy. Banks are characterized not
only by their specialized role as relationship-based lenders with hard-
to-replace informational advantages vis-a`-vis small- and medium-sized
ﬁrms, they are also often funded with high leverage from dispersed cred-
itors, be they depositors with demandable claims or (increasingly) whole-
sale market lenders with short-term claims that may not be reﬁnanced.
These features of bank liabilities make it extremely difﬁcult to renegotiate
their debt—to a combination of debt reduction and equity-like claims for
example—directly with their creditors, and hence governments often play
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a direct role in ameliorating the problems arising from banks having a
large degree of “debt overhang”—a surfeit of future ﬁxed claims relative
to potential future values of their extant assets in adverse scenarios.
As Myers (1977) recognized in a pathbreaking paper, this gives rise to
underinvestment by equityholders, or management acting in their inter-
est, because much of any future cash ﬂows generated by such investments
could accrue to extant creditors, while the costs of investments would be
borne by existing equityholders—either directly, or via a reduction in
their future payoffs arising from additional promised repayments to
new ﬁnanciers whose claims would typically be junior to those of existing
creditors. With voluntary participation, a policy of injecting funds into
such banks in order to improve their incentives to invest and lend must
take into account that existing equityholders have an option value that
arises from the expectation of proﬁts after repaying their creditors in the
upper tail of the distributions of their future asset values.
In this paper, we investigate the properties of two often-used mechan-
isms for providing such cash injections to troubled banks, namely, Equity
Injections in return for the government acquiring a partial share of a
bank’s equity capital, and Asset Buyouts (or, asset buybacks), whereby
the government injects cash into a bank in return for acquiring ownership
of a subset, or fraction, of its (troubled) assets. We do so in a setting in
which bank managements, who we assume to be acting in the interests of
their shareholders, are privately informed about the qualities of their
illiquid and risky troubled assets and new investments. As a clear conse-
quence of such asymmetric information, fund injection mechanisms to
alleviate debt overhang must be carefully designed so as not to leave too
much surplus for banks’ current equityholders, relative to the status quo
values of their claims in the absence of alleviating debt-overhang-related
problems.
Not surprisingly, given the enormity of the scales of recent fund injec-
tions, or bailouts, of especially larger banks with signiﬁcant holdings of
“toxic” assets, these issues have received much attention in policy-related
debates and in the emerging academic literature. In the former sphere,
policy-makers have vacillated, regarding massive asset buyout programs
such as TARP (Troubled Assets Relief Program) in the United States,
much of the budgeted resources for which were later switched to equity
injections as with Citibank, for example. Bebchuk (2009) provides a sum-
mary of considerations involved in evaluating asset qualities and their
likely equilibrium valuations for such buyout programs; Schaefer and
Zimmermann (2009) consider a related set of issues for bank recapital-
ization, coupled with creation of “bad banks” to manage assets acquired
by the bailout agency.
In a more detailed analytical vein, Landier and Ueda (2009), as well as
Philippon and Schnabl (2012), have discussed the relative merits of some
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alternative bailout mechanisms that have been considered. Landier and
Ueda (2009) consider an asymmetric information environment in which
banks have private information about their default risks, but there is no
issue of their incentives to invest in new assets. They conclude that an
efﬁcient mechanism for bailing out banks from defaulting is to provide an
ex post guarantee to their creditors, to pay them the difference between
the face values of their claims and what their debtor bank can repay in an
adverse future state. In our context, featuring an investment disincentive
problem arising from debt overhang, such a purely ex post debt guaran-
tee would do nothing to resolve the problem. The reason is that, when a
debtor bank would invest, much of any additional cash ﬂows generated
by such investment would accrue to their extant creditors in the adverse
future states and hence serve to reduce the value of any guarantee from
the perspective of the bank’s equityholders who would bear (directly or
indirectly) the cost associated with the investment. That is the case be-
cause, by assumption, cash ﬂows arising within the bank from new in-
vestments can not be distinguished—neither by their creditors, nor by
their debt guarantor—from those accruing from the old assets in place.
Philippon and Schnabl (2012), on the other hand, do analyze a fully
ﬂedged debt overhang environment with asymmetric information as
above, in which the resulting disincentive to invest is of concern.
Another concern of theirs is opportunistic participation, whereby banks
that do not need bailouts choose to participate in the program because of
the ﬁnancial subsidies it provides. Comparing equity injections and asset
buyouts, they conclude that equity injections dominate. Their reasoning
is that because equity injections allow the bailout agency to share in the
upside of new investments, they reduce opportunistic program participa-
tion by banks that do not need the bailout and thus reduce the aggregate
cost of the scheme. Our approach and conclusions are different.
We make use of a basic insight from the screening literature that
efﬁciency may be improved through the use of menus of contracts (e.g.
Stiglitz 1975; Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976; Wilson 1977). Thus, we allow
the bailout agency to offer a menu of plans, each item in the menu being
tailored for a particular type (of bank quality), taking into account the
incentive compatibility constraint that a bank will choose the plan
that maximizes value to its extant shareholders. In contrast, Philippon
and Schnabl (2012) allow the bailout agency to only offer a single con-
tract.1 We show, with returns to assets-in-place ordered by ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance, that constrained optimality can be achieved by a
single plan when there are only two types. With S 2 types, S – 1 plans
1 We also allow for more heterogeneity across banks in the returns to assets-in-place and new investments,
and our menu approach means the bailout agency does not need to have full knowledge of the joint
distribution of returns across types.
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are needed.2 Constrained optimality involves nonlinear pricing; the larger
the injection, the smaller the price per unit being sold (shares of equity or
assets). Worse banks require larger injections, and thus the plans invol-
ving larger injections are tailored for them. But, this also means that
larger injections must involve smaller prices per unit because of partici-
pation constraints—banks’ shareholders must do at least as well with a
bailout as without.
We also show that a feature of constrained-optimal plans is that they
require overcapitalization. This is so as to make it unattractive for better
quality banks to choose the plans intended for lower quality banks. A
high level of dilution at a low price per share is not a good deal for
high-quality banks. Types that do not need a bailout or have no positive
NPV investments can be deterred from participating in the bailout
scheme simply by not including plans in the menu that are favorable to
them.
With respect to comparing asset buyouts and equity injections, we
derive an equivalence result, namely, that a constrained-optimal menu
of equity injections can be replicated by a menu of asset buyouts. This
holds under the assumption that new investment opportunities follow the
assets. That is, a bank’s future investment opportunities are reduced in
proportion to the assets it sells, with the lost opportunities going to the
buyer of the assets. In this scenario, there is no difference with respect to
the upside from new investments the bailout agency obtains in an equity
injection or an asset buyout, which also provides intuition for our equiva-
lence result.
If investments follow the bank (interim investment opportunities are
not affected by the sale of assets-in-place), equity injections offer more
participation in new investments to the bailout agency than asset buy-
outs. We show by way of an example that this can damage or enhance
efﬁciency, depending on whether screening intensity is needed mostly on
assets-in-place, which favors asset buyouts, or new investments, which
favors equity injections.
In general, the initial cash outlay for the bailout agency in an equity
injection is smaller than in an asset buyout. Subsequent outlays relating
to future investments may be equal, as in our baseline model, or, if not,
can potentially be avoided by selling equity or assets before the invest-
ment is to be made. Under the belief that raising bailout funds involves
social costs, for example, because taxes need to be increased and/or other
valuable spending is crowded out, one may be tempted to conclude that
the smaller initial outlay favors equity injections. However, the
2 By constrained optimality here, we mean that all positive net present value (NPV) investments are made
(that is, bailouts solve banks’ debt overhang problems) and net subsidies to existing claimants are
minimized, subject to voluntary participation.
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fundamental reason equity injections are smaller is that they have implicit
leverage. If the bailout agency can borrow against the assets it buys in an
asset buyout, it can achieve the same, relatively low need for public funds
as under an equity injection.3 Thus, if the bailout agency can raise funds
on fair terms in the market, the larger size of asset buyouts is not in and
of itself a drawback. In our baseline model, where equity injections and
asset buyouts result in the same level of subsidies, this observation leads
us to a simple Miller-Modigliani-style irrelevance result, even if there are
social costs associated with using public money to bail out banks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we set out the
notation for our space of bank types, their return distributions, and two
main bailout programs. The main analysis is carried out in Section 2,
with general extensions considered in Section 3. Section 4 considers issues
that address more speciﬁcally the optimality of equity injections versus
asset buyouts. Section 5 concludes. An appendix contains all proofs that
are not provided in the text.
1. The Model
The model addresses the problem as to how to restructure a “weak”
bank’s balance sheet in preparation for its return to normal banking
activities, including raising fresh capital. In the absence of a bailout, a
debt overhang problem prevents the bank from raising new capital. The
bailout that is needed to overcome the debt overhang problem must take
place ex ante, because it is assumed that there will not be sufﬁcient time to
bail out a bank the instant investment (lending) opportunities arrive. The
notion that the bailout process is slow, while investment opportunities
can be ﬂeeting, echoes Huberman (1984).4
There are three dates, t¼ 0,1,2. A central agency (a government with
powers of taxation) is considering bailing out banks at date 0. Banks ini-
tially have assets-in-place, which pay off at date 2 according to two-point
distributions that depend on a bank’s type. The NPV of new investment
(lending) opportunities, which arrive at the interim date (time 1), also de-
pends on a bank’s type. Only a bank’s management knows its type and the
management’s objective is to maximizes the value of existing shareholders’
equity. There is universal risk neutrality, and the risk-free rate is 0.
3 Enhancing bailout funds through leverage is a feature of The European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF),
which is authorized to borrow on the market to increase funds available for ﬁnancial assistance to euro
area member states (European Financial Stability Fund, European Sovereign Bond Protection Facility
Launched, February 17, 2012, www.efsf.europa.eu/mediacentre/news/2012/2012-05-european-sovereign-
bond-protection-facility-launched.htm).
4 Huberman (1984) develops a model of external ﬁnancing and liquidity in which there is not sufﬁcient time
to raise funds once an investment opportunity arises. It has to be raised in advance. We only assume that
there is not sufﬁcient time to do a bailout.
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Banks are indexed by s 2 S ¼ f1, . . . ,Sg. The assets-in-place of a bank
of type s either returns Hs (state w¼H; the “up-state”), with probability
ps, or Ls<Hs (state w¼L; the “down-state.”) Thus, the date 0 full infor-
mation value of the assets-in-place of a bank of type s is
As ¼ psHs þ ð1 psÞLs: ð1Þ
Each bank can be viewed as having separate up and down states. No
assumption is made regarding any interdependence between different
banks’ up and down states. However, it is assumed that Hs and Ls are
(weakly) increasing in s, whereas ps is strictly increasing. Thus, the quality
of a bank is increasing in s, in the sense that the distribution of future
returns from the assets-in-place of a bank of type s ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates that of a bank of type s0 < s. Moreover, As is increasing in s.
The interim investment costs I and returns ~Xs þ I at date 2, where ~Xs is
a random variable. Let Xs ¼ E½ ~Xs, where E½ is the expectations oper-
ator. Thus, Xs represents the NPV of the investment opportunity. This is
also assumed to be (weakly) increasing in s. So, banks with better
assets-in-place also have better investment opportunities, perhaps reﬂect-
ing managerial skill or positive synergies between assets-in-place and in-
vestment opportunities. Let Xmins denote the greatest lower bound of the
distribution of future returns from the new investment net of I.5
Banks have only two types of claims outstanding; senior debt
(including deposits) and common stock. All debt matures at date 2.
The promised payment, F, on debt is independent of bank type, which
is meant as a scale normalization. We assume:
A1. Ls þ Iþ Xmins  F for all s
and
A2. Ls<F<Hs for all s.
A1 says that if the interim investment is taken, creditors will be paid off
in full regardless of which state occurs at date 2. A2 says that the debt is
risky without the new investment or a capital injection. It also sets up the
potential for a debt overhang problem, because it implies a wealth trans-
fer to creditors if the interim investment is made. By A1, at date 1 the
expected wealth transfer is (1  ps)(F  Ls).6 Thus, to generate a debt
overhang problem for all types, we also assume that
A3. 0 < Xs < ð1 psÞðF LsÞ for all s.
5 Xmins could, for example, be the realization of X

s in the down-state of the assets-in-place. However, we do
not require X

s to be contingent on the state ws or to have a two-point distribution.
6 A1 thus allows us to capture the key idea of debt overhang that new investments involve wealth transfers
to creditors in the simplest possible way.
Review of Corporate Finance Studies / v 2 n 1 2013
34
Given A3, equityholders will not ﬁnance a positive NPV project be-
cause the transfer to creditors exceeds the NPV. This debt overhang
problem motivates bailouts.7
A bailout plan is a pair of two-tuples
B ¼ ðð,CÞ,ð,EÞÞ 2 ð½0,1  ½0,1ÞÞ  ð½0,1  ½0,1ÞÞ
that describe an asset buyout and an equity injection, respectively.
 2 ½0,1 is the fraction of assets that are bought, and C 0 is the total
amount that is paid for these assets. l 2 [0,1] is the fraction of all shares
the bailout agency obtains if it injects E 0 in fresh equity capital. After a
bailout, B, the asset value at date 2, excluding payoffs of new invest-
ments, if any, for w¼H,L is
wBs ¼ ð1 Þws þ Cþ E: ð2Þ
This assumes that (1) the stochastic rates of return on a banks’ remaining
assets after a partial sale remain the same as that on its assets as a whole
and (2) all cash injections are initially invested in the riskfree asset. We
also assume that (3) interim investments follow the assets rather than the
bank itself. That is, the scale of interim investments available to the bank
is proportional to the assets kept on the bank’s books; available new
investments cost ð1 ÞI and return ð1 Þð ~Xs þ IÞ. The “lost” invest-
ment opportunity accrues to the buyer of the assets. In Subsection 4.2 we
consider an alternative setup where a bank’s investment opportunities are
not reduced when assets are sold.
If the investment is not taken, the date 2 (realized) payoff to date 1
equityholders net of interim investment costs is max½wBs  F,0. If it is
taken, this becomes max½wBs þ ð1 Þð ~Xs þ IÞ  F,0  ð1 ÞI. Let
1investjB,s be an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the interim invest-
ment is made and 0 if not (given bailout plan B and type s). We have
1invest B,sj ¼ 1 iff E max½wBs þ ð1 Þð ~Xs þ IÞ  F,0
 
 ð1 ÞI  E max½wBs  F,0
 
,
ð3Þ
where the expectation on the left-hand side is taken over the joint distri-
bution of ws and ~Xs, whereas on the right-hand side it is taken over the
marginal distribution of ws.
8
The expected net payoff to the original shareholders of a bank of type s
under bailout plan B is thus
7 Bailouts could also be motivated by a desire to shore up a bank’s balance sheet to prevent a run and the
social costs that would be involved. Social costs and beneﬁts from a bailout will be considered in Section
3, where we also relax A3.
8 The condition for investing can also be written as ð1 ÞXs weakly exceeding the wealth transfer to
creditors (the difference in the value of the debt with and without the investment).
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ZBs ¼ ð1 Þ E max½wBs þ ð1 Þð ~Xs þ IÞ1investjB,s  F,0
 
ð1 ÞI 1investjB,s

:
ð4Þ
If there is no bailout, payoffs to equity and creditors are equivalent to
those under the “null plan,” B0  ðð ¼ 0,C ¼ 0Þ,ð ¼ 0,E ¼ 0ÞÞ, where
by A3 the interim investment does not take place.
Let B be a collection, or menu, of bailout plans, and let Bs 2 B satisfy9
Bs ¼ arg maxB2BZBs : ð5Þ
In other words, for any menu of bailout plans, the best plan for the
existing shareholders of a bank of type s is denoted Bs. The dependence
of Bs on a given menu, B, is suppressed in the notation, for ease of
reading. We write
Bs ¼ ððs,CsÞ,ðs,EsÞÞ: ð6Þ
Given B, the condition for the bank to accept a bailout is that old share-
holders are no worse off with the best plan in the offered menu than
without, that is,
ZBss  ZB0s ¼ psðHs  FÞ: ð7Þ
Bailouts may involve a private loss to the agency because of the partici-
pation constraint (7) and because of a positive wealth transfer (subsidy)
to creditors, as described above. The bailout agency seeks to choose a
menu of bailout plans to incentivize banks to take all positive NPV in-
vestments, while minimizing its own loss. Put differently, the bailout
agency’s objective is to maximize social surplus, while keeping as much
as possible of the increase in surplus brought about by bailouts in public
hands. This can be motivated, for example, by political pressure, or moral
hazard concerns, not to reward bad past performance. It is also equiva-
lent to saying that the bailout agency seeks to maximize its own expected
proﬁt from the bailout program, subject to banks making efﬁcient invest-
ment decisions and voluntary participation.
More precisely, the bailout agency’s objective is to choose a menu B to
minimize
X
S
qs Cs  s½psHs þ ð1 psÞLs þ Xs|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
net subsidy from asset buyout
þ Es  
1 Z
Bs
s|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
net subsidy from equity injection
8>><
>>:
9>>=
>>;
ð8Þ
9 If for a given s there are multiple plans that satisfy (5), Bs can be picked arbitrarily among them.
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subject to (5), (7), and10
1investjBs,s ¼ 1 for all s, ð9Þ
and where qs is the prior (unconditional) probability that a bank is of
type s. Constraint (5) means that each bank chooses the plan in the menu
that maximizes the wealth of its existing shareholders. Constraint (7)
means that doing so leaves the existing shareholders as least as well off
as without a bailout. Constraint (9) says that under the best plan, Bs, for a
bank of type s, debt overhang is eliminated (the interim investment is
made). By A1, the subsidy to creditors is ﬁxed when the investment is
taken (at (1  ps)(F  Ls) for each s), and we can write the minimization
problem as
min
B
X
S
qsZ
Bs
s ð10Þ
subject to the same constraints, (5), (7), and (9).
We deﬁne a constrained-optimal menu of bailout plans to be such that
the above program is solved with the participation constraint, (7), being
binding. In other words, a constrained-optimal menu achieves efﬁcient
investment levels with zero windfall to equityholders. Because the subsidy
to creditors is ﬁxed when interim investments are taken, a constrained-
optimal menu implements efﬁcient investment, while keeping total
subsidies at the lowest theoretical possibility, given voluntary bailout
participation and no expropriation of assets or claims.
2. Analysis
The main focus of our analysis lies in identifying constrained-optimal
bailout plans. We show how to construct them and in the process estab-
lish existence results, describe the explicit form they take, and derive their
key characteristics. We also compare and contrast equity injections with
asset bailouts.
Deﬁne
L^s  Ls þ Xs
1 ps and E^s  F L^s: ð11Þ
Lemma 1
Under a pure equity injection, debt overhang is eliminated if and only if
E  E^s.
10 By A3, Xs40 for all s. Maximization of surplus therefore implies 1investjBs ,s ¼ 1 for all s. In Section 3,
we allow for the possibility that Xs may be nonpositive.
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This is intuitive. It is simply a rewriting of the observation that to
overcome the debt overhang problem, the capital injection from the bail-
out must be large enough that the NPV exceeds the expected transfer to
creditors. E^s is thus the minimum equity injection needed for bank s to
make the interim investment. This is strictly decreasing in s, that is, worse
types need larger injections to overcome the debt overhang.
We continue with another observation, from which we can deduce an
irrelevance result with respect to equity injections versus asset buyouts.
Lemma 2
There is a one-to-one mapping with respect to payoffs to (old)
equityholders between equity injection and asset buyout bailout plans. In
particular, the pure equity injection plan ðl,EÞ and the pure asset buyout
plan ð,CÞ result in the same interim investment decision and the same
state-by-state payoff to (old) equityholders provided that  ¼ l and
C ¼ ð1 lÞEþ lF.
This has two immediate and important implications. First, the set of
payoffs to old equityholders induced by a menu of equity injection plans
can be replicated with a menu of asset buyout plans (and vice versa).
Thus, the incentive compatibility constraints that arise from a menu of
equity injections can be replicated with a menu of asset buyouts. Second,
for an equity injection plan that solves the debt overhang problem for a
bank of type s, there is a corresponding asset buyout plan that gives the
same state-by-state payoffs to all claimholders and the bailout agency
(and vice versa). As a corollary of these two observations, we have
Proposition 1
If there is a menu of pure equity injection plans that yields constrained
optimality, then there is also a menu of pure asset buyout plans that does so
(and vice versa). One can go from one to the other by applying the mapping
in Lemma 2.
If constrained optimality can be achieved by a menu of pure equity
injection or asset buyout plans, then it can also be achieved by a menu of
mixed plans (being convex combinations of the pure equity and asset
buyout plans that achieve constrained optimality). Furthermore and im-
portantly, Lemma 2 also implies that for any mixed plan there is an
equity injection plan that gives the same payoff to old equityholders.
Thus, if there is a menu of mixed plans that achieve constrained optimal-
ity, there is also a set of pure equity plans that does so. In short, in terms
of ﬁnding conditions under which constrained optimality can be
achieved, it sufﬁces to study pure equity injection plans. We have there-
fore chosen to cast our analysis in terms of these. However, below we also
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compare the characteristics of constrained-optimal equity injection plans
to their corresponding constrained-optimal asset buyout plans.
2.1 Constrained-optimal menus
Our focus is on a scenario in which there can be downside heterogeneity,
that is, Ls varies across types, but upside homogeneity, that is,
A4. Hs¼H for all s.
This can be motivated by thinking of the assets held by the bank as
loans, whose future values have a ﬁxed upper bound equal to the pro-
mised repayments of the loans. Furthermore, the up-state can be thought
of as representing a benign macroeconomic environment in which a
bank’s portfolio of loans performs in an actuarially predictable
manner; there is minimal uncertainty with respect to the fraction of
loans that default and the corresponding writedowns, and there is a
well-functioning liquid secondary market (possibly through the process
of securitization) for loans that have not yet matured. The down-state can
be thought of as a negatively shocked economy, where asset values and
market liquidity are reduced. In the down-state, default probabilities,
writedowns, and the extent to which there is a secondary market for
loans will thus depend to a larger extent on individual loan characteris-
tics. In other words, a shocked economy ampliﬁes underlying differences
in the quality of loan portfolios as compared with when the economy is in
a benign state. Thus, banks’ private information about the characteristics
of their assets (loan portfolios) matters especially when the economy is
shocked. Our assumption of downside heterogeneity but upside homo-
geneity captures this asymmetry.
We solve for constrained-optimal menus by ﬁrst ﬁnding the share-cash
indifference curves that leave equityholders indifferent between a bailout
and the status quo. Using Lemma 1, the indifference curve for bank s is
given by the locus of l’s and E’s that satisfy
psðH FÞ ¼
ð1 ÞpsðHþ E FÞ if E < E^s
ð1 Þ psðHþ E FÞ þ ð1 psÞðL^s þ E FÞ
h i
if E  E^s:
(
ð12Þ
Thus, the indifference curve can be written
sðEÞ ¼
1 HFHþEF if E < E^s
1 psðHFÞ
psðHþEFÞþð1psÞðL^sþEFÞ if E  E^s:
(
ð13Þ
The properties of these indifference curves and the way they shift as s
changes are key to characterizing constrained-optimal menus. An illus-
tration is provided by Figure 1.
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Figure 1 shows the curves for two types described by H¼ 120, F¼ 100,
L^1 ¼ 80, L^2 ¼ 90, p1 ¼ 0:5, and p2¼ 2/3. Observe ﬁrst that the two indif-
ference curves coincide as long as E is too small to solve the debt over-
hang problem for either type, that is, E 	 E^2 ¼ 10. However, as
E becomes larger than E^2, the curve for the higher type (s¼ 2) moves
above that for the lower type. This “uplift” arises when the equity injec-
tion is so large that equity shares in the payoff in the low state. It also
reﬂects the additional value from the interim investment. As E becomes
larger than E^1, the curve for the lower type also changes functional form.
Its slope increases and exceeds that of the curve of the higher type, since
an extra dollar of injections now contributes relatively more to the equity
20 40 60 80
E
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Type 1
Type 2
l
Figure 1
Share-cash indifference curves for two types.
The indifference curves represent (l,E) combinations that keep existing equity to its status quo expected
payoff. The parameter values used in the plots are as follows: H¼ 120, F¼ 100, L^1 ¼ 80, L^2 ¼ 90,
p1¼ 0.5, and p3¼ 2/3. Constrained optimality is achieved, for example, by choosing the plan represented
by the intersection point (l¼ 2/3,E¼ 30) of the two curves. Any combination of two plans designed as
follows will also work: Plan 1, any point on Type 2’s indifference curve with 10<E< 30. Plan 2, any
point on Type 1’s indifference curve with E430.
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value of the lower (and less valuable) type. The greater slope of the indiffer-
ence curve of the lower curve eventually allows it to cross the curve of the
higher type at ð ¼ 2=3, E ¼ 30Þ. That such an intersection point exists is
intuitive as it simply means that as E increases, the total contribution to
equity eventually becomes larger for the less valuable type.This intersection
point is unique (forE  E^2).With a single bailout plan deﬁned by this inter-
sectionpoint, debt overhang is solved for both types, andby constructionof
the indifference curves, theminimal level of subsidy to existing claimholders
is obtained. In other words, in our example, one constrained-optimal menu
simply exists of the single bailout plan, ð ¼ 2=3, E ¼ 30Þ.
The result illustrated in Figure 1, that there is a unique plan that
satisﬁes constrained optimality for s¼ 1,2, is general. Deﬁne
A^s  psHþ ð1 psÞL^s: ð14Þ
Proposition 2
Suppose a bank is one of two types, s¼ 1,2, where L^1 < L^2, Hs ¼ H, p1
< p2.
11 There is a unique pure equity injection bailout plan,
BEð1,2Þ ¼ ðð1,2Þ,Eð1,2ÞÞ, that for both banks resolves debt overhang and
achieves the minimal subsidy. The bailout plan is given by
ð1,2Þ ¼ ðH FÞðp2  p1Þ
p2Hþ ð1 p2ÞL^2  ðp1Hþ ð1 p1ÞL^1Þ
¼ 1 ðH FÞðp2  p1Þ
A^2  A^1
,
ð15Þ
and
Eð1,2Þ ¼ F
p2 Hp1 þ L^1 1 p1ð Þ
 
 p1 Hp2 þ L^2 1 p2ð Þ
 
p2  p1
¼ F p2A^1  p1A^2
p2  p1 :
ð16Þ
Under this plan, both banks are overcapitalized: The equity injection is
strictly greater than the minimum needed to overcome debt overhang
fully, that is, Eð1,2Þ>E^1>E^2.
The bailout plan BEð1,2Þ ¼ ðð1,2Þ,Eð1,2ÞÞ represents the unique intersec-
tion point (for E  E^2) of the two types’ indifference curves, for example,
the point ð ¼ 2=3,E ¼ 30Þ in Figure 1. The subsidy-minimizing debt
relief program can also be implemented with a menu of two bailout
plans, which can be chosen so as to ensure separation between the two
11 L^1 < L^2 results when L1 	 L2,X1 	 X2, and p1 < p2.
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types. Any menu ðð1,E1Þ,ð2,E2ÞÞ satisfying the following conditions will
do: (1) ði,EiÞ is on the indifference curve of type i; (2) E2 2 ðE^2,Eð1,2ÞÞ;
and (3) E1>E
ð1,2Þ, where Eð1,2Þ is given by (16).
The common feature of all constrained-optimal bailout menus is that the
low type must be overcapitalized so as to ensure that the high type is not
oversubsidized. This is evident in the example in Figure 1. Strict separ-
ation between the two types, while keeping old equity to its status quo
payoff, implies that the plan tailored for type 1 must be on this type’s
indifference curve with an E to the right of the intersection point, that is,
E1>30; whereas the plan tailored for type 2 must be on this type’s in-
difference curve with E2 2 ð10,30Þ. In contrast, just resolving debt over-
hang requires injections of 20 and 10 for types 1 and 2, respectively.
When there are more than two types, we can calculate the unique
intersection points, as above, for each pair. To achieve constrained opti-
mality, we need monotonicity of the intersection points, in the following
sense:
Definition 1
(Monotonicity of indifference curve intersection points)
Suppose there are S  3 bank types, and for each type s41 let
ððs1,sÞ,Eðs1,sÞÞ be the intersection point of the share-cash indifference
curves of bank types s – 1 and s, as defined by (15) and (16).12 These S – 1
intersection points are monotonic if Eðs1,sÞ 	 Eðt1,tÞ whenever s4t.
The intersection points referred to here represent the unique
constrained-optimal common equity injection bailout plans for two ad-
jacent bank types, as given in Proposition 2. Intersection-point monoton-
icity is necessary to ensure constrained optimality. A graphical
illustration of intersection-point monotonicity and its importance for
constrained optimality is provided in Figure 2.
Figure 2 depicts the indifference curves of three types, s¼ 1,2,3, with
p1< p2< p3, and L^1 < L^2 < L^3. The dashed, dotted, and solid lines are
the curves for types 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Focusing on the segments of
these curves after they no longer coincide, we see that the solid (type 3)
and dotted (type 2) curves intersect at a smaller E than does the dotted
and dashed (type 1) curves. This is intersection-point monotonicity.
As a result of intersection-point monotonicity, there is also indifference
curve monotonicity with respect to which type has the maximum l for a
given equity injection. Speciﬁcally, we see in Figure 2 that for low E, type
3 is willing to give away a larger share of the equity than types 2 and 1.
For intermediate E’s, type 2 is willing to give away a larger l than the
12 Substitute s for 2 and s – 1 for 1 in these equations.
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other two types. And, for high E’s, type 1 is willing to give away a larger
share. Thus, it is possible to design a menu of three bailout plans that
achieves constrained optimality by offering (1) a plan with a low E and a
l that falls on the indifference curve of type 3; (2) a plan with an
intermediate E and a l that falls on the indifference curve of type 2;
and (3) a plan with a high E and a l that falls on the indifference
curve of type 1.13 Constrained optimality can also be achieved with the
two plans deﬁned by the two intersection points (of the indifference
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Type 1
Type 2
Type 3
Figure 2
Share-cash indifference curves for three types: Constrained optimality achievable.
The indifference curves represent (l,E) combinations that keep existing equity to its status quo expected
payoff. The parameter values used in the plots are as follows: H¼ 120, F¼ 100,
L^1 ¼ 80, L^2 ¼ 85, L^3 ¼ 90, p1¼ 0.5, p2¼ 0.55, and p3¼ 2/3. Intersection-point monotonicity is satisﬁed.
The indifference curves of Types 2 and 3 intersect at (l¼ 0.59,E¼ 22.86), and the indifference curves of
Types 1 and 2 intersect at (l¼ 0.76,E¼ 42.5). The curves coincide for E	 10. Constrained optimality can
be achieved, for example, by offering a menu of the two plans corresponding to these two intersection
points.
13 “Low” E means E 2 ½E^3,Eð2,3ÞÞ; “intermediate” E means E 2 ½Eð2,3Þ,Eð1,2ÞÞ; and “high” E means E  Eð1,2Þ.
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curves of types 1 and 2 and then again of types 2 and 3). If intersection-
point monotonicity does not hold, such constructions are not possible
and obtaining constrained optimality would not be feasible.
Theorem 1
Suppose L^s and ps are strictly increasing in s and Hs¼H for all s. A menu
of equity injection plans that (1) achieves full relief of debt overhang for
each bank type, s ¼ 1, . . . ,S and (2) provides the equityholders of each type
with an expected payoff equal to the status quo level exists if and only if the
indifference curve intersection points are monotonic, which holds if and only
if
psþ1ð1 psÞL^s  psð1 psþ1ÞL^sþ1
psð1 ps1ÞL^s1  ps1ð1 psÞL^s
>
psþ1  ps
ps  ps1 ð17Þ
for s ¼ 2, . . . ,S 1.
With more than two types, it is intuitive that the construction of a
constrained-optimal menu is not possible if two or more of the types
are “too close.” Condition (17) makes this notion of “closeness” precise.
Note that using the mapping from equity injections to equivalent asset
buyouts described in Lemma 2, any optimal menu of equity injections can
be replicated with a corresponding menu of asset buyouts.
We now turn to discussing the key characteristics of constrained-
optimal bailout plans implied by the analysis above. We are especially
interested in the pricing scheme implied by a constrained-optimal menu.
Normalizing the number of initial shares to 1, the number of new shares
under a pure equity injection plan is =ð1 Þ. Thus, the price per new
share is Eð1 Þ=. Under an asset buyout plan, the price per 100% of
the assets is simply C=.
Proposition 3
(Characteristics of constrained-optimal bailouts)
Consider constrained-optimal menus of either pure equity or pure asset
buyout plans. Let ðs,EsÞ be the equity plan picked by type s. Let ðs,CsÞ be
the corresponding asset buyout plan (using the mapping in Lemma 2).
Constrained-optimal bailout plans have the following characteristics:
1. The size of the chosen plan is decreasing in bank quality; that is, s,
Es, s, and Cs are all decreasing in s.
2. Overcapitalization: Except possibly for the highest type, banks
are overcapitalized. For pure equity injections (alternatively, asset
buyouts), this is to say that Es>E^s (alternatively,
Cs>F ½ð1 ÞLs þ Xs=ð1 psÞÞ.
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3. For pure equity injections (alternatively, asset buyouts), the price
paid by the bailout agency per new share (share of the assets) is
decreasing in the amount of capital injected, Es (alternatively, Cs).
4. The amount of capital injected is larger for asset buyouts than for
equity injections ðCs>EsÞ.
That both ls and Es (as well as s and Cs) are decreasing in s follows
from intersection-point monotonicity. Intuitively, these results reﬂect that
higher types need smaller injections to overcome the debt overhang prob-
lem. The nonlinear pricing structure under constrained-optimal bailout
menus relates to the (piecewise) concavity of the share-cash indifference
curves. Concavity is a simple implication of the fact that an additional
dollar of new equity contributes a smaller and smaller share of the equity
value as the equity injection increases. More fundamentally, nonlinear
pricing is a direct consequence of constrained optimality: Because lower
quality banks need larger injections, larger injections will have to be
associated with lower per unit prices, especially because constrained op-
timality implies that old equityholders are being kept to their status quo
payoffs.
Overcapitalization is necessary so as to not oversubsidize higher types,
because for an injection that injects the exact amount that eliminates debt
overhang for type s, a bank of type s0>s would be willing to give away a
larger share (as illustrated in Figure 1). A simple way to think about the
result that more capital needs to be used in pure asset buyout plans than
in equivalent pure equity injection plans is that it is compensation for the
reduction in assets. In other words, more capital is needed to solve the
debt overhang problem when assets are reduced (but see also Section 4).
Our nonlinear pricing (decreasing price per share in the size of the
bailout) illustrates that any bailout plan that allows a bank to sell any
quantity of assets or shares that it wishes at a ﬁxed price (or linear
pricing)—possibly subject to an upper bound—is fundamentally limited,
as constrained optimality is generally not achieved under such plans.
Linear pricing only works in the case of two types.14 Our analysis implies
that, in general, linear schemes either confer excessive windfalls on bailed
out shareholders or result in underinvestment.
2.2 Example
Here, we present an example that illustrates the role of the indifference
curve intersection points in constructing constrained-optimal menus of
14 Using Figure 1 as an example, draw a straight line that is tangent to the indifference curves of both types.
The two points of tangency represent separating plans. Any other construction with linear pricing is not
possible. Using Figure 2, it is easy to see that this linear construction is not possible for more than two
types.
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bailout plans. The example also highlights the overcapitalization and the
nonlinear pricing structure that results from constrained-optimal menus.
There are three types, all with F¼ 100, Hs¼ 120,Xs¼ 5, and Ls and ps
as follows:
Type: s¼ 1 s¼ 2 s¼ 3
Ls 70 73.89 75
ps 0.5 0.55 2/3
L^s 80 85 90
where L^s is calculated from (11).
These parameter values satisfy (17) so that indifference curve
intersection-point monotonicity holds. Constrained-optimal menus of
bailout plans therefore exist. The intersection points of the indifference
curves are as follows:
l E
Types 2 and 3 0.59 22.89
Types 1 and 2 0.76 42.50
By the analysis above, a menu consisting of these intersection-point
contracts will achieve constrained optimality. A feature of such a menu is
that type 2 is, by construction, indifferent between the two plans. As
discussed above, the intersection points can also be used to construct
other menus consisting of three plans that strictly separate out the
three types. Using the mapping in Lemma 2, equivalent pure asset
buyout plans, ð,CÞ, are: (0.59, 68.70) and (0.76, 86.47), respectively.
Table 1 presents expected payoffs under these bailout plans to equity-
holders (with and without making the interim investment) and the bailout
agency (with the interim investment). It also shows the gross subsidies to
equity- and debtholders, which are seen to differ from the bailout
agency’s payoff by the NPV of 5.
The example illustrates the two key characteristics of optimal bailout
plans, namely, overcapitalization and nonlinear pricing. Overcapitaliza-
tion can be seen from the fact that the plans inject more capital than is
necessary to overcome the debt overhang problem for each type (E^s). The
nonlinear pricing of the plans in Table 1 is illustrated in Table 2.15
We see that as the dilution, l, or share of assets sold, , increases
(moving from Plan 1 to Plan 2), the price per share (equity injection)
or price per 100% of the assets (asset buyout) falls. The low type prefers
selling at the lower price because at the higher price the total size of the
15 Recall that, normalizing the number of old shares to 1, under a pure equity injection the number of new
shares is =ð1 Þ and the price per new share is Eð1 Þ=. Under an asset buyout, the price per 100%
of the assets is simply C=.
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cash injection is too small. Creditors would collect too much of the
aggregate date 2 payoff in the down state. The high price/low dilution
plan preferred by the high type dilutes the old shares of the low type by
too much.
Finally, let us compare the outcome of the two-plan menus discussed
above to that of the kind of single-plan program studied by Philippon
and Schnabl (2012). Speciﬁcally, consider the single-plan program that
induces all three types to invest that has the lowest expected subsidy.
From the geometry of the indifference curves,16 it is clear that the
single equity injection plan that induces all three types to invest at the
lowest expected subsidy is represented by the intersection point of types 1
and 3. In our example, this is (l¼ 2/3,E¼ 30.00). In comparison, for type
2, the l that keeps old equityholders to the status quo payoff is 67.88
when E¼ 30. Thus, the single plan essentially subsidizes type 2 equity-
holders by 1.22 percentage points, in terms of the dilution in an equity
injection. In terms of amount, the subsidy is 0.42. This represents 8.33%
of the NPV of the interim investment. In contrast, with two plans, it is
possible to keep equityholders to their status quo, that is, giving
Table 1
Examples of constrained-optimal menus of bailout plans: Equity injections versus asset buyouts
Type Prob Ls Xs L^s E^s Expected payoff to old equity If invest, expected . . .
low Status Bailout Bailout Subsidy Subsidy Subsidy Payoff
Quo Not invest Invest Old equity Debt Total Bailout ag.
Panel A: Plan 1. Equity injection, l¼ 0.59 and E¼ 22.86. OR Asset buyout,  ¼ 0:59 and C¼ 68.70.
1 (worst) 0.5 70 5 80 20 10 8.70 9.28 0.72 15 14.28 9.28
2 (medium) 0.45 73.89 5 85 15 11 9.57 11 0 11.75 11.75 6.75
3 (best) 0.33 75 5 90 10 13.33 11.59 13.33 0 8.33 8.33 3.33
Panel B: Plan 2. Equity injection, l¼ 0.76 and E¼ 42.50. OR Asset buyout,  ¼ 0:76 and C¼ 86.47.
1 (worst) 0.5 70 5 80 20 10 8.82 10 0 15 15 10
2 (medium) 0.45 73.89 5 85 15 11 9.82 11 0 11.75 11.75 6.75
3 (best) 0.33 75 5 90 10 13.33 11.18 12.35 0.98 8.33 7.35 2.35
Note that Hs¼H¼ 120 for all types. The net total subsidy is the Total Subsidy less the NPV of the
interim investment, Xs.
Table 2
Example of nonlinear pricing: Equity injections and asset buyouts
Plan 1 Plan 2
Small injection Large injection
Equity injection, price per new share 15.89 13.41
Asset buyout, price per 100% of assets 116.44 113.77
Preferred by Highest type Lowest type
Plans 1 and 2 are as deﬁned in Table 1.
16 See Figure 2 and the proof of Proposition 2.
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equityholders zero subsidy, as illustrated in Table 1. Across all types, the
total subsidy in the example in Table 1 is 35.08. The increase in total
subsidies from using the single plan is 1.19% of this. Larger differences
across types will give increased oversubsidization from the single plan.
3. Extensions
This section modiﬁes the baseline model in three respects. In the ﬁrst
subsection, we introduce public costs and beneﬁts from a bailout as
well as additional types that do not need or warrant a bailout. In the
second subsection, we consider variable costs to raising bailout funds.
The analysis focuses on equity injections. Unless otherwise speciﬁed, all
assumptions of the baseline model are maintained, and the parameter
values are such that the monotonicity condition in Deﬁnition 1 holds.
3.1 Additional types and public costs and beneﬁts
We start by introducing net public beneﬁts of Ys that arise if the interim
investment is made, in addition to the NPV of Xs that accrues to the
bank. This could result from, for example, a reduction in the probability
of a bank run and/or incremental economy-wide NPV arising from the
bank’s interim lending activity. Fixed costs of administrating a bailout
are netted out. Because Ys does not affect shareholders’ payoffs or par-
ticipation and incentive compatibility constraints, these public beneﬁts do
not affect the analysis above. However, the size and sign of Ys may affect
the extent to which a bailout is desirable. Ys is assumed to increase in s.
Suppose now that some optimally types should not be bailed out because
Xs þ Ys 	 0. Speciﬁcally, there is a type n such thatXs þ Ys 	 0 if and only
if s	 n. Constrained optimality now involves types s	 n not being bailed
out. Consider a pure equity injection menu consisting of the S n 1
leftmost indifference curve intersection points (see Deﬁnition 1 and
Figure 2). By construction, all plans in the menu make the shareholders
of banks with type s	 n worse off. The menu thus shuts out types with
Xs þ Ys 	 0, as these types voluntarily choose not to be bailed out.17 Also
by construction (by the same logic as in Subsection 2.1), for s4n, banks
pick plans that induce the interim investment and leave equityholders to
their status quo payoff. Hence, constrained optimality is achieved.
Suppose next that there is no debt overhang problem for some types.
Constrained optimality would now be achieved if these types are not
bailed out, whereas banks facing a debt overhang problem are bailed
out with minimal net subsidies as before.
17 Xs þ Ys 	 0 includes the possibility that Xs 	 0. In this case, the bank chooses not to make the interim
investment. So if Xs 	 0, we need to set L^s ¼ Ls and therefore also E^s ¼ F Ls. Indifference curves are
still given by (13), and the analysis is as before.
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Proposition 4
Suppose there is t such that Xs  ð1 psÞðF LsÞ for all s4t and that we
have monotonicity of indifference curve intersection points (according to
the formulas in Definition 1).18 Suppose also that Xs þ Ys>0 for all
s ¼ 1, . . . ,S.19 If t41, constrained optimality is achieved by a menu
consisting of the t – 1 intersection-point plans fððs1,sÞ,Eðs1,sÞÞgts¼2 as
defined in Definition 1. If t¼ 1, a single-plan menu fð1ðEÞ,EÞg with
E  Eð1,2Þ implements constrained optimality.
In other words, types that do not need a bailout can be locked out by
not including plans that are tailored for them. They do not take plans
tailored for lower types as these dilute equity too much.
These results show that it is straightforward to deal with the possibi-
lities that some banks do not warrant or need a bailout. Simply select the
submenu (of intersection-point plans) that only includes the plans tai-
lored for the intermediate types that need and warrant bailouts. In par-
ticular, this means that the characteristics of constrained-optimal plans
described in Proposition 3 are robust to these possibilities.
3.2 Variable costs to raising bailout funds
It is sometimes argued that raising bailout funds involve variable dead-
weight costs. Such costs might arise if the use of public funds crowds out
other valuable spending. In this subsection, we examine whether such
variable costs affect our result that constrained optimality is achieved
through a separating menu. All assumptions of the baseline model are
maintained. In addition, there are net beneﬁts, excluding variable costs
from raising bailout funds, of Ys  0 from making the interim investment
that are increasing in s. Here, we view Ys as including Xs.
Suppose therefore that there are public costs of kE from raising public
funds of E to bail out a bank, where k40 is a constant. The ﬁrst issue we
need to address is how to incorporate these costs into the objective func-
tion of the bailout agency. The costs from bailouts in our baseline model
are subsidies to creditors and shareholders. But, these are redistributions
rather than direct costs.20 Thus, we face a modeling decision as to how
to combine deadweight costs and subsidies. Letting WðBÞ denote the
18 Note that for s4t, the underlying curves ls(E) that are implicit in Deﬁnition 1 no longer represent the
true indifference curves of these types. Still, it is these curves that our assumption here deals with.
19 This is without loss of generality, because if there are types with Xs þ Ys 	 0, redeﬁne type s¼ 1 to be the
smallest type with Xs þ Ys>0 (and allow the index s to be nonpositive, to denote the cases for which
Xs þ Ys 	 0).
20 The expectation of these contingent redistributions may lead to costs at some earlier, unmodeled stage.
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expected payoff to the bailout agency from offering menu B, we proceed
by assuming that the bailout agency’s objective is to
max
B
WðBÞ ¼ max
B
X
S
qs Ys1investjBs,s  kEs  hQs
 
, ð18Þ
where h40 is a constant, and
Qs ¼ Es  s
1 s Z
Bs
s ð19Þ
is the net subsidy to claimholders of type s from bailout plan Bs, as it
equals the difference between the bailout agency’s capital injection and
the value of the shares it gets in return.21 Maximization is subject to bank
participation and incentive compatibility constraints, as before.
For simplicity, assume now that there are only two types, s¼ 1,2.
Bailouts are required for the interim investment to be made (by A3).
We ask whether the bailout agency is better off with a separating or
pooling menu.22
Consider the (separating) menu
B?  fB?1,B?2g  fð?1,E?1Þ,ð?2,E?2Þg  fðð1,2Þ,Eð1,2ÞÞ,ð2ðF L^2Þ,F L^2Þg:
ð20Þ
By construction, given B?, type s picks plan B?s , both types invest, and net
subsidies are kept to the minimum.23 B? is the separating menu with the
lowest total equity injection, among those with minimal subsidies. We
assume
A5. Under B?, for all s, Ys exceeds kEs þ hQs.
Thus, B? represents a separating contract through which the bailout
agency gains from bailing out both types.
Deﬁne M  q1E?1 þ q2E?2. This is the expected equity injection under
B?. Expected deadweight costs are therefore kM.
Proposition 5
(1) If F L^1 M, the bailout agency is strictly better off with B? than any
alternative one-plan menu. Suppose next that F L^1 < M. (2) Given h
(and values for the other exogenous parameters), there is k>0, bounded
away from zero, such that B? is strictly better for the bailout agency
21 An alternative speciﬁcation involves replacing Qs by Q^s, where Q^s ¼ Qs  ð1 psÞðF LsÞ. That is, Q^s is
the excess net subsidy, beyond what is given to creditors. This would not change our conclusions
substantively.
22 A pooling menu is a one-plan menu that both types prefer over the alternative of no bailout.
23 Strictly speaking, both types are indifferent between the two plans. To generate strict preferences, modify
B
s to be on ls(E) arbitrarily close to B


s (on the right) as it is deﬁned in (20).
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than any one-plan menu as long as k < k. (3) Given k (and values for the
other exogenous parameters), there is h, bounded away from 1, such that
B? is strictly better for the bailout agency than any one-plan menu as long
as h> h.
For an intuition of this result, recall that under B?, both types make the
interim investment and subsidies are at their minimal theoretical value.
Thus, to have any chance on improving on B?, an alternative one-plan
menu must reduce the expected equity injection, while making both types
invest.24 But, if F L^1 M, this is impossible. If F L^1 < M, a pooling
plan that reduces equity injections is feasible. But, because type 2’s indif-
ference curve lies above that of type 1 for E 2 ½F L^1,M, this will ne-
cessarily increase subsidies to type 2. The saving in deadweight costs will
not offset the increase in subsidies if k is sufﬁciently small or h sufﬁciently
large.25
The proposition shows, under fairly general conditions, that separating
menus that induce both types to make the interim investment dominate
pooling contracts (or one-plan menus in general). Although B? is not
necessarily the optimal separating menu, the proposition points to the
robustness of our previous result regarding the separation of types
through a menu of plans that overcapitalize banks (except possibly the
best type).
4. Equity Injections versus Asset Buyouts
Proposition 1 shows that equity injections and asset buyouts are equiva-
lent in our baseline model, in the sense that if constrained optimality can
be achieved with a menu of pure equity injections, then it can also be
achieved with a menu of pure asset buyouts, and vice versa. In this sec-
tion we discuss two potential caveats to this conclusion.
4.1 Bailout size, costs, and leverage
Because constrained-optimal equity injections are smaller than equivalent
asset buyouts (Proposition 3), one might be tempted to conclude that
variable costs to raising bailout funds favor equity injections over asset
buyouts. In our baseline model, subsequent capital outlays are the same,
given the 1-1 mapping described in Lemma 2. If the bailout agency does
not sell its shares or asset holdings after the bailout, it will have to inject
24 Making only type 2 invest is optimally done with just offering B
1. But, this is strictly dominated by B

, by
A5. Making only type 1 invest is possible only with E>E
1, which makes the bailout agency worse off
than under B
 conditional on either type and therefore also in expectation.
25 This basic intuition remains valid if variable deadweight costs are nonlinear, though some details of the
formal argument would have to be modiﬁed.
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I ¼ I of fresh capital at date 1 to fund the interim investment, either as
a shareholder in the bank or as a direct holder of assets. A simple intu-
ition for why initial equity injections are smaller is that because assets are
reduced under asset buyouts, more capital needs to be injected in to deal
with the debt overhang problem. However, a more fundamental reason is
that equity injections are implicitly levered; the equity that is being
bought is levered. In contrast, basic asset buyouts are unlevered transac-
tions and, as such, require more upfront “public equity ﬁnancing” than a
plain equity injection.
This leads us to a standard Miller-Modigliani line of reasoning. In an
asset buyout, the bailout agency can replicate the implicit leverage of an
equity injection by borrowing against the assets it buys. The issue as to
whether the smaller size of equity injections is an advantage therefore
centers around the risk-adjusted cost of borrowing to ﬁnance an asset
bailout. Even if raising bailout funds through increased taxes or cutting
public spending involves variable costs, if the bailout agency can borrow
on fair terms, the bailout size itself is a matter of irrelevance. This con-
clusion regarding bailout size is not model speciﬁc. The question as to
whether borrowing by the bailout agency is cheap, expensive, or fair can
only be settled empirically.
4.2 An alternative model of asset buyouts
It has been argued by Paul Krugman26 and Philippon and Schnabl
(2012), among others, that an advantage to equity injections is that the
bailout agency shares in the NPV of new investments. But, these authors
do not consider the possibility of using menus to separate out different
types, including types that do not need or warrant bailouts. Allowing for
this, we have found that equity injections and asset buyouts may be
equivalent. A caveat to this conclusion, however, is that our analysis is
based on the assumption that investments follow the assets, thus giving
the bailout agency a share of the upside from new investments under asset
buyouts too.
Consider now a variation of our baseline model in which asset buyouts
provide no participation in interim investments to the bailout agency
because investment opportunities follow the bank rather than the
assets. This is to say that the available investments at the interim date
are not affected by the fraction  of the assets-in-place that are
transferred to the bailout agency at date 0. So, if the investment
is taken, the (realized) payoff to date 1 equityholders is now
max½wBs þ ~Xs þ I F,0  I. Thus, under an asset buyout, the bailout
agency has no share in the upside from new investments. We ask whether
26 See, for example,“Gordon Does Good” (op ed) by Paul Krugman, New York Times, October 13, 2008.
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this makes asset buyouts worse than equity injections in terms of achiev-
ing constrained optimality.
Given bailout plan B and type s, the investment condition now
becomes
1investjB,s ¼ 1 iff E max½wBs þ ~Xs þ I F,0
  I  E max½wBs  F,0 ,
ð21Þ
where the expectation on the left-hand side is taken over the joint distri-
bution of ws and ~Xs, whereas on the right-hand side it is taken over the
marginal distribution of ws. The expected net payoff to the original share-
holders of a bank of type s under bailout plan B in this new setup is thus
ZBs ¼ ð1 Þ E max½wBs þ ð ~Xs þ IÞ1investjB,s  F,0
  I 1investjB,s : ð22Þ
This differs from the corresponding equation, (4), in the baseline model if
>0.
We focus on pure asset buyout plans. The modiﬁed setup has no effect
on the analysis of pure equity injections. Deﬁne
Cs  F Xs
1 ps  Ls
H Fþ Xs1ps
H Ls ¼
F Ls  Xs1ps
H Ls H: ð23Þ
Using (21) and a similar reasoning as in Section 2, we get that the indif-
ference curve for asset buyouts is given by27
sðCÞ ¼
C
H if C <
Cs
ð1psÞðLsFÞþXsþC
As
if C  Cs:
(
ð24Þ
As before, constrained optimality can be achieved if and only if the inter-
section points of the indifference curves are monotonic. Under pure asset
buyouts, the formula for the intersection point of types s and s – 1 is
Cðs1,sÞ ¼ As1½ð1 psÞðLs  FÞ þ Xs  As½ð1 ps1ÞðLs1  FÞ þ Xs1
As  As1 :
ð25Þ
Intersection-point monotonicity is that Cðs1,sÞ 	 Cðt1,tÞ for s4t.
An example with three types is provided in Figure 3. This uses the same
parameter values as in Figure 2 and Tables 1 and 2. Notice that
intersection-point monotonicity holds for the asset buyout indifference
curves as they do for the equity injection ones. This is thus an example of
constrained optimality being achievable with either equity injections or
asset buyouts. Even though asset buyouts involve no upside from new
27 We sketch the derivation of (24) in the Appendix. For simplicity, we modify A1 to Iþ Xmins  F for all s,
in order to ensure full repayment to creditors in case the investment is taken.
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investments to the bailout agency, they are just as good as equity injec-
tions in this example.
However, this is not a general result. Table 3 tabulates the intersection
points for equity injections and asset buyouts in three scenarios. The ﬁrst
scenario corresponds to Figures 2 and 3, where equity injections and asset
buyouts are equivalent; intersection points are monotonic (decreasing),
implying that constrained optimality can be achieved, under either
method. In the second scenario, the high type has a larger NPV from
interim investments and the middle type’s assets-in-place move closer to
that of the high type. In this scenario, equity injections are superior to
asset buyouts. So here, upside to the bailout agency is valuable. In the
third scenario, the middle type’s interim investment becomes as good as
30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
C
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Type 1
Type 2
Type 3
Figure 3
Indifference curves under asset buyouts when interim investment opportunities follow the bank.
The indifference curves represent ð,CÞ combinations that keep existing equity to its status quo expected
payoff. The parameter values used in the plots are as follows: H¼ 120, F¼ 100, L1¼ 70, L2¼ 73.89,
L3¼ 75, p1¼ 0.5, p2¼ 0.55, p3¼ 2/3, and Xs¼ 5 for all s. The indifference curves of Types 2 and 3
intersect at ð ¼ 0:76,E ¼ 82:65Þ, and the indifference curves of Types 1 and 2 intersect at
ð ¼ 0:59,E ¼ 65:72Þ. Thus, intersection-point monotonicity is satisﬁed. The curves coincide for
C	 26.67. Constrained optimality can be achieved, for example, by offering a menu of the two plans
corresponding to the two intersection points.
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the high type’s, but the middle type’s assets-in-place moves closer to that
of the low type. In this scenario, asset buyouts are superior. So here,
upside to the bailout agency is damaging.
To get an intuition for these results, let us focus on the middle type,
because the high and low types can always be separated from each other
(as illustrated in Figure 1 for equity injections). In Scenario 2, the middle
type looks more like the bad type with respect to its interim investments
and more like the good type with respect to its assets-in-place. Because of
the high upside from new investments to the good type, this type is willing
to sell its assets-in-place relatively cheaply; that is, its indifference curve
shifts up (relative to Scenario 1). This makes it harder to separate out the
middle type, especially because the middle type is close to the good type
with respect to the value of its assets-in-place. This effect is more pro-
nounced the more of the upside the good type can keep, which is under
asset buyouts (when investments follow the bank rather than the assets).
Thus, asset buyouts work less well when the middle type is close to the
good type with respect to the value of assets-in-place and close to the bad
type with respect to the NPV of interim investments. The upside from
new investments to the bailout agency offered by equity injections is good
in this scenario because it turns up the screening intensity on the interim
investment, and this is where the biggest difference is between the middle
and the high type.
Scenario 3 is the reverse situation; the middle type looks like the good
type with respect to interim investments and like the bad type with re-
spect to assets-in-place. In this case, it is helpful to turn up the screening
intensity on assets-in-place, leading asset buyouts to dominate equity
injections.
These examples illustrate that when investments follow the bank, there
is no clear-cut choice between equity injections and asset buyouts. Upside
to the bailout agency may be good in terms of achieving constrained
optimality, but it can also be damaging, depending on which element
screening is needed more: assets-in-place or interim investments.
Table 3
Examples of asset buyouts versus equity injections when investment opportunities follow the bank
Scenario and Parameters Intersection points
preferred method L2 p2 X2 X3 C
(1,2) C(2,3) E(1,2) E(2,3)
1. Either one 73.89 0.55 5 5 82.65 65.72 42.50 22.86
2. Equity injection 74.5 0.60 5 6 77.06 96.40 34.00 31.00
3. Asset buyout 71 0.60 6 6 87.41 76.90 32.00 35.00
The table presents the intersection points of share-cash indifference curves for pure asset buyouts and
pure equity injections in three scenarios. Common parameter values are H¼ 120, F¼ 100, L1¼ 70,
L3¼ 75, p1¼ 0.5, p2¼ 0.67, and X1¼ 5. The other parameters vary across scenarios. A method is pre-
ferred if it allows for a separating menu. The condition for this is that the intersection points are
monotonically decreasing in type. For asset buyouts, the condition is Cð1,2Þ>Cð2,3Þ, as calculated from
(25). For equity injections, the condition is Eð1,2Þ>Eð2,3Þ, as calculated from (16).
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This also suggests that using warrants to try to obtain more upside to the
bailout agency, as suggested by Philippon and Schnabl (2012), is not
necessarily optimal when one allows for screening through menus.
5. Policy Choices and Concluding Remarks
The main results of importance for economic policy emerging from
our analysis are the following. When banks have troubled assets,
having potential future values strictly below their debt-cum-deposit
obligations, and they are heterogeneous on multiple dimensions—here
their probabilities of default and losses given default—it is nevertheless
feasible to structure a bailout program that minimizes the implied
subsidies to the equityholders of different, and privately informed,
bank types, holding their payoffs at the same level as their status
quo equity values in the absence of such bailouts. This can be done,
under the conditions spelled out in Proposition 2 and Theorem 1
above, using separating menus of either equity injection, or asset
buyout menus, which induce self-selection among heterogeneous bank
types. Such optimal menus of bailout plans involve nonlinear pricing,
whereby the price per share (or per unit of asset) is decreasing in the
size of the bailout.
Furthermore, quite robustly, with heterogeneous losses given default
that covary positively with likelihoods of default across banks, such
menus necessarily induce overcapitalization—cash injections over and
above the minimal amounts needed to overcome debt overhang—at
weaker banks. The extent of such overcapitalization, and thus the
degree to which the bailout agency must acquire equity stakes in the
bailed out banks, increases as the quality of the bank declines, in terms
of both its likelihood of default and loss given default. In addition, under
an equity-injection-based bailout plan, weaker banks are left with lower
inside equity stakes for their prior shareholders. This is not the case with
asset-buyout-based bailout plans, in which prior equityholders retain full
ownership stakes in the assets remaining with the bank.
We also ﬁnd that equity injections involve lower cash outlays by the
bailout agency than asset buyouts. This is a result of the implicit leverage
the bailout agency buys into with an equity injection. This may be of
importance if there are social costs associated with raising government
funding. However, if the bailout agency can borrow on fair terms in the
market against the assets it takes on in an asset buyout, the initial cash
outlay is not important, as such. In this case, in our baseline model in
which interim investment opportunities are reduced in an asset buyout,
equity injections and asset buyouts are equivalent, in the sense that if it is
possible to achieve constrained optimality with one method, it is possible
to do so with the other one as well.
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More generally, the features described above of the two types of bail-
out programs may impinge on policy choices over these. The lower share
of inside equity under equity injections, as compared with asset buyouts,
may ill serve banks’ incentives to monitor the quality of their future
investments, because government capital would bear some or even
much of the costs of future losses arising from such lax monitoring. On
the other hand, equity injections have an advantage if raising bailout
funds involve a social cost. The optimal solution may depend on the
interplay between the social costs, if any, of raising bailout funds and
the losses, if any, arising from reduced inside holdings.
In an extension to our baseline model, where interim investment
opportunities are not reduced in an asset buyout, we ﬁnd that the fun-
damental irrelevance result in our baseline model breaks down, without
the need to introduce social costs from raising bailout funds or agency
costs. Our analysis of this alternative model indicates that equity injec-
tions do a better screening job than asset buyouts when bank types are
differentiated more by the NPV of their future investment opportunities.
But, if banks are differentiated more by their assets-in-place, then asset
buyouts may be better than equity injections. Thus, upside to the bailout
agency can be damaging as well as value enhancing. In this version of our
model, equity injections and asset buyouts are seen to perform different
functions, and the preference for one or the other bailout program, or a
mixture of the two, depends on the speciﬁc circumstances of individual
banks.
Although we have included the possibility of public beneﬁts to bailouts
in our analysis, we have not explicitly modeled a system-wide bailout in
which cross-spillover effects make banks’ incentive compatibility con-
straints dependent on the outcome for other banks. As emphasized by
Gorton and Huang (2004) and more recently by Tirole (2012), this may
be important in a systemic crisis. Incorporating such effects in our screen-
ing model of bank bailouts with equity injections and asset buyouts
would be an interesting avenue for future research.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
This follows from (3), using A1–A3. Details: For an equity injection, (l,E), (3) becomes
psE max½Hs þ Eþ ~Xs þ I F,0jHs
 þ ð1 psÞE max½Ls þ Eþ ~Xs þ I F,0jLs  I
 psmax½Hs þ E F,0 þ ð1 psÞmax½Ls þ E F,0:
ð26Þ
Using A1 and A2, this reduces to
ps Hs þ E F½  þ ð1 psÞ Ls þ Eþ Xs1ps  F
h i
 ps Hs þ E F½  þ ð1 psÞmax½Ls þ E F,0,
which, using A3, is true if and only if E  E^s. œ
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Proof of Lemma 2
Let us refer to the mapping  ¼  and C ¼ ð1 ÞEþ F as M. Equivalence of investment
decision: By (3), under a pure equity injection, the interim investment is made if and only if
(26) holds. The corresponding condition under a pure asset buyout is
psE max½Hsð1 Þ þ Cþ ð ~Xs þ IÞð1 Þ  F,0jHs
 
þð1 psÞE max½Lsð1 Þ þ Cþ ð ~Xs þ IÞð1 Þ  F,0jLs
  Ið1 Þ
 psmax½Hsð1 Þ þ C F,0 þ ð1 psÞmax½Lsð1 Þ þ C F,0:
ð27Þ
The mapping M makes all corresponding terms of (26) and (27) equivalent (to a factor of
1 ). Thus, the investment condition is equivalent, as are realized payoffs. œ
Proof of Proposition 2
From the expression for the indifference curve, sðEÞ for a bank of type s, Equation (13), we
see that the indifference curve changes functional form and shape as E goes from
representing undercapitalization, E < E^s, to overcapitalization, E>E^s. It is straightforward
to verify that (1) sðEÞ is strictly increasing and, on each region, strictly concave; (2) 0sðEÞ
rises strictly as E enters the overcapitalization region; and (3) 0sðEÞ> ddE E=ðHþ E FÞ for
E>E^s.
From (13), we also see that l1(E) and l2(E) coincide for E 	 E^s. Thus, 2ðEÞ>1ðEÞ imme-
diately to the right of E^2, by observation (2) above. Furthermore, by observation (3),
2ðEÞ>1ðEÞ for all E 2 ðE^2,E^1. To establish the proposition, we therefore need to show
that l2(E) and l1(E) intersect once and only once for E>E^1.
Observe now that on the overcapitalization region, E>E^s,
0
sðEÞ is strictly decreasing in
ps. Therefore, l2(E) and l1(E) can at most intersect once. Now, inspection of (13) shows that
for sufﬁciently large E, we have 2ðEÞ < 1ðEÞ, because p2 is strictly larger than p1. Thus,
since the two curves are continuous, there is a unique point of intersection. Straightforward
calculations using (13) show that the two curves intersect at E as given by (16), and at this
point, l1 and l2 are as given by (15). œ
Proof of Theorem 1
The statement that constrained optimality can be achieved if and only if monotonicity of
indifference curve intersection points holds follows from preceding results and the
discussion in the text (it is straightforward to formalize and extend the discussion regarding
intersection monotonicity in the text to an arbitrary number S of types). We need to show
that indifference curve intersection-point monotonicity holds if and only if (17) holds for all
s ¼ 2, . . . ,S 1. To this end, pick any s 2 f2, . . .S 1g. Monotonicity of indifference curve
intersection points implies that Eðs,sþ1Þ < Eðs1,sÞ, or by (16),
F psA^s1  ps1A^s
ps  ps1 >F
psþ1A^s  psA^sþ1
psþ1  ps : ð28Þ
Using A^s ¼ psHþ ð1 psÞL^s (and the analogous expressions for s – 1 and sþ 1), (28)
simpliﬁes to (17). œ
Proof of Proposition 3
Focus first on equity injections. (1) This is immediate from Proposition 2 and Theorem 1.
(2) Let s<S. By Theorem 1 and the associated discussion, Es  Eðs1,sÞ>E^s, where the last
inequality follows from Proposition 2. For s¼S, the discussion immediately preceding
Theorem 1 shows that we can have ES ¼ E^S.28 (3) Normalizing the number of old shares
28 Strictly speaking, all types are indifferent between the status quo and ð,EÞ ¼ ðSðE^SÞ,E^SÞ, even though
this does not solve the debt overhang problem for any other type than s¼S. This can be dealt with by for
example not including this plan in the menu, in which case the highest type will have to be overcapitalized
as well.
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to 1, under a pure equity injection plan, the number of new shares is s=ð1 sÞ. Thus, the
price per new share under a pure equity injection plan is Esð1 sÞ=s. This is decreasing in
s because both ls and Es are decreasing in s. Note that (1)–(3) can be extended to pure asset
buyouts by using the mapping in Lemma 2. (4) This follows directly from the mapping in
Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 4
By Theorem 1 and the associated analysis, the offered menu implements constrained
optimality for the subset of types that face a debt overhang problem, that is, types s0 	 t. We
need to show that type s4t, that does not face a debt overhang problem, will not take any
of the plans. Pick any s4t. The status quo payoff is (using an * to denote the absence of a
debt overhang problem)
Z
s ¼ ps Hs  Fð Þ þ ð1 psÞ Ls þ
Xs
1 ps  F
	 

¼ psðHs  FÞ þ ð1 psÞðL^s  FÞ: ð29Þ
Thus, the share-cash indifference curve becomes

s ðEÞ ¼ 1
psðH FÞ þ ð1 psÞðL^s  FÞ
psðHþ E FÞ þ ð1 psÞðL^s þ E FÞ
: ð30Þ
A comparison with ls(E) as given by (13) shows that 
s ðEÞ < sðEÞ for E  F L^s.
Furthermore, letting s0 	 t, by the monotonicity of indifference curve intersection points,
sðEðs01,s0 ÞÞ < ðs01,s0 Þ. Hence, type s would be worse off by accepting any of the intersection
point plans on offer. œ
Proof of Proposition 5
Let BA ¼ fðA,EAÞg be an alternative one-plan menu. We start by showing that
WðBAÞ WðB
Þ requires EA 2 ½F L^1,E
1Þ. To this end, observe first that under B
 both
types take the interim investment and Ys  kE
s  hQs>0,s ¼ 1,2. Furthermore, by
construction, B
2 is the constrained-optimal plan conditional on s¼ 2, because
E
2 ¼ F L^2 is the smallest equity injection that induces the interim investment for a
bank of type 2, and gross subsidies are at their minimal level, ð1 p2ÞðF L2Þ. Thus,
improving on B
 requires reducing the equity injection taken by type 1, while inducing the
interim investment. This requires
EA 2 ½F L^1,E?1Þ, ð31Þ
which we henceforth assume.
Next, we argue that WðBAÞ WðB
Þ also requires A ¼ 1ðEAÞ. Now, if A>1ðEAÞ,
type 1 will optimally pick no plan. This strictly reduces utility to the bailout agency relative
to under B
, because by assumption, Y1  kE1  hQ1>0 under B
1. (There is an additional
loss of utility to the bailout agency from type 2 not being bailed out with B
2). If
A < 1ðEAÞ, type 1 will pick BA, but subsidies are strictly increased relative to having
A ¼ 1ðEAÞ. Thus, we must have
A ¼ 1ðEAÞ, ð32Þ
which we henceforth assume.
Offered BA with (31) and (32), both types take the plan and make the interim investment.
For type 1, net subsidies are the same as under B?. But, for type 2, net subsidies are strictly
higher, because 2ðEAÞ>1ðEAÞ ¼ A for EA 2 ½F L^1,E?1Þ. Therefore, changing the menu
from B? to BA, brings about a strict increase in expected net subsidies. At the same time,
expected deadweight costs change by
k½q1ðEA  E?2Þ  q2ðE?1  EAÞ ¼ k EA M
 
:
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Thus, if EA M, expected deadweight costs also increase, implying that the bailout agency
is worse off. Hence, if F L^1 M, the utility to the bailout agency falls regardless of k or h.
This establishes (1).
Suppose next that F L^1 < M. Now, WðBAÞ WðB?Þ requires EA < M, which we hen-
ceforth assume. The maximum expected reduction in equity injections occurs when EA is at
its minimum, F L^1, and equals
G ¼M ðF L^1Þ:
Denote the increase in subsidy costs resulting from type 2 picking BA rather than B?2 by
HðEAÞ. Deﬁne
H ¼ q2 inffHðEAÞjEA 2 ½F L^1,MÞg:
Note that H is bounded away from 0 because 2ðEÞ>1ðEÞ on ½F L^1,M. (2) follows by
setting k ¼ H=G, because for k < H=G the reduction in expected deadweight costs is less
than the increase in expected subsidy costs. (3) follows directly from the observation that H
is strictly increasing in h with lim
h!1
H ¼ 1 and from the fact that G is bounded. œ
Sketch of derivation of (24)
Under a pure asset buyout plan, ðs,CÞ, (21) becomes
psE max½Hsð1 sÞ þ Cþ ~Xs þ I F,0jHs
 
þ ð1 psÞE max½Lsð1 sÞ þ Cþ ~Xs þ I F,0jLs
  I
 psmax½Hsð1 sÞ þ C F,0 þ ð1 psÞmax½Lsð1 sÞ þ C F,0:
ð33Þ
Assume (which will have to be veriﬁed) that Hsð1 sÞ þ C F  0. Using this, (33)
reduces to
Lsð1 sÞ þ Xs
1 ps þ C F  max½Lsð1 sÞ þ C F,0,
which holds whenever C  F Lsð1 sÞ  Xs=ð1 psÞ. In turn, after some algebra, this
yields (23) and (24). It is straightforward to verify that Hsð1 sÞ þ C F  0 when s is
given by (24). œ
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